“…Chinese see their history through the lens of chaos/order with the forces of the latter fighting a constant battle against the former.”
Jeremiah Jenne of Jottings from a Granite Studio explains, in general, how the Chinese may differ from North Americans and Western Europeans when it comes to what they fear and expect from their government. From “It’s not ‘Who do you love?’ that matters, but ‘What do you fear most?’“, Jeremiah starts off with an anecdote, setting up the question:
In class two weeks ago we were watching the documentary series China From the Inside, when one of my students asked, with some reason, that if there was so much hardship and discontent why does the CCP enjoy such broad support?
It was a good question, and like all good questions it depends on whom you ask and how you phrase the question.
He explains how Chinese citizens may often be at odds with each other with different — even violently conflicting — views on the current CCP government’s policies. However, in contrast to the “tyranny” that many “Westerners” have traditionally and been socialized to fear from their governments (but not only governments), these same divided Chinese citizens are united by a common fear:
And so I try to remind my students that the question to “What do you fear most?” looks very different from the Chinese historical experience, particularly that of the last 140 years or so.
From the Chinese perspective, particularly as written in the history textbooks used in PRC schools today, the greatest horrors have not come at the hands of the all-powerful state, but in times when the state was too weak to defend itself and the people. Think of the depradations of the European imperialist powers in the 19th century at the expense of a rapidly weakening Qing Empire. There is the starvation and disasters of the warlord period in the early 20th century, when China was for all intents and purposes Afghanistan on steroids, and the ‘central government’ consisted of a parade of military leaders in control of the 10 square blocks around the “Presidential Palace” in Beijing. Even under a period of relative prosperity in the 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek’s control never extended much past a few central provinces in the Yangzi region. Locked in struggle with the CCP, the Nanjing government lacked the political will or wherewithal to build a new society or improve the lives of China’s rural population, and soon even that gargantuan task would take a back seat to mere survival as the forces of both the KMT and the CCP were overrun by the Japanese onslaught.
Even if we look at the latter half of the 20th century, a period not covered quite so thoroughly in the PRC school curriculum, the personal experience of so many Chinese during the Cultural Revolution serves as fresh reminder as to what happens when the central government abandons order and stability in the name of “idealism.”
Whether or not you personally agree with this interpretation or not, the salient point is that many Chinese see their history through the lens of chaos/order with the forces of the latter fighting a constant battle against the former.
So, the Chinese tolerate, support, or defend the bullying and tyranny of a CCP government because it keeps order and stability. This makes little sense to many who come from other nations and backgrounds, but isn’t seeing and understanding these things from the Chinese background, history, and experiences the whole point? If we do, genuinely, understand these fears of the Chinese people, are we stuck begging them to let go or are we actually trying to help them move on? Do we actually know how to help? Are we supposed to?
Read the full — and excellent — post over at Jottings from the Granite Studio»
Image source: appow
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I think the caveat should be that this only a part of China. It’s a lot like Jackie Chan’s statement that freedom breeds chaos.
In addition, the US does oppose “tyranny”, but it also opposes “anarchy” obviously. A better dichotomy that represents America is the old debate since the founding times between Hamilton and Jefferson.
I also believe one missing piece that is touched on, but not mentioned, is that the Chinese political culture implies that the state has a monopoly on order, and the laobaixing don’t (or can’t) contribute to it. This interpretation might explain why most of the time the central government is looked upon as responsible for order. Though I have to say this is only another piece of the puzzle as well.
Finally, I can definitively say that this Jeremiah Jenne is not much of a science fiction fan at all. There is science fiction that depicts tyranny as bad, but there’s an equal amount that depicts disorder, anarchy, chaos as bad too. Examples abound in post-apocalyptic fiction, America balkanizes fiction, and zombie fiction. And also let’s not forget Starship Troopers or Ender’s Game for depictions of militarized society.
I read Jeremiah’s post on his site, but was unable to comment on it over there. I think he does a super job of setting out just how stark the differences are between what Chinese and Westerners expect of their governments.
It’s practically impossible for most Westerners to understand the Chinese point-of-view because our past experiences don’t include traumas such as the Cultural Revolution or Great Leap Forward. And even though the younger Chinese didn’t have to experience those times, they have been reared by parents who did — parents who have taught them to just work hard, keep their heads down and mouths shut.
Should “we” “help”? (I’m going to assume by “we” you mean the US, and by “help” you mean doing something to force China to do things “our” way.)
That’s a good question, but a tough one. China has become too big for the US to push around, not that it has ever done any good anyway. But fortunately for the US, I don’t think this is necessary.
Just contrast China with Taliban-era Afghanistan. China is doing a great job of educating everyone, including girls. People are generally free to do and say what they want as long as they don’t cross the line of publicly challenging the rule of the Party. Yes, China still has a lot of work to do in the areas of local corruption, property rights and rule-of-law, but at least they recognize these as problem areas.
The fact that many Chinese are still desperate to go to the US, and will willingly overstay their visas not to return to China is clear evidence that China could makes some improvements. It’s just not clear to me that the US would have any role in changing that aside from making conditions in the US less bearable (and, unfortunately, I wouldn’t completely rule that out).
And while I wish the US could get out of Afghanistan now, when I look back, I’m happy that the Taliban no longer rules, and I hope the US and its allies can prevent their return to power. In the case of China, this is a government that takes seriously its responsibility for peoples’ livelihoods, so really, even if the US had the ability to take out China’s government, it’s not necessary — assuming, of course, that’s what you meant by “we” and “help”. :-)
“And while I wish the US could get out of Afghanistan now, when I look back, I’m happy that the Taliban no longer rules, and I hope the US and its allies can prevent their return to power.”
Slightly tangential perhaps, but wouldn’t it be great if China got serious about helping to tackle the chaos on its own doorstep?
I suspect their reluctance is partly fear of involvement in a cross-border conflict, but mostly a well-worn strategy of watching gleefully as the US becomes embroiled in another costly overseas venture.
I’ve been having a thorough read of Chang & Halliday’s “MAO: The Unknown Story,” and while I’d most likely side with these two authors’ detractors who claim that the pair have a colossal bone to pick (read: an “agenda”), there’s a great deal to be validly said about the zeal with which the Cult of Mao pursued its various terror techniques during the the Chairman’s three decades of rule — with particular emphasis on the Cultural Revolution. The reality is that it matters little to the average spoon-fed Western media consumer about the breadth of Chinese history — and sadly for the latter, I might add — and what is most relatable is that which is readily recalled. The mental imagery of the rural ravages of the late 1960s in China is something which is salient and which stands out as the consummate Chinese badness. That’s going to be hard to unseat. Coupled with 1989, that’s a very tall order and therefore relegates the discussions of the eminent Mr. JJ, whose views I otherwise completely side with, to the rarefied air of the intellectual high ground, a place where the hoi-polloi generally don’t tread.
“isn’t seeing and understanding these things from the Chinese background, history, and experiences the whole point?”
I really don’t think that this fear of instability is a “Chinese” viewpoint if what you mean by “Chinese” is ‘representative of the Chinese people’. The original article was careful to say only that “many Chinese” feel this way and that this is a view promulgated by PRC (ie CCP) textbooks. I would argue that many more Chinese people simply don’t have this feeling. Fear of luan is an argument that’s always done the rounds in academic circles. And one that is probably legitimately characterised as promoted by the CCP. Show me one person whose primary fear is luan, and I’ll show you five who are more concerned with corruption or other forms of deprivation caused by an excess of State power.
Why do people support the CCP (in front of outsiders at least)? It’s not because of fear of luan. It’s purely patriotism and ignorance of the alternatives, both of which are encouraged by the state. Try this test: engage a sample of nongmin on the subject of the development of a welfare system or other social safety net. You’ll quickly realise that they have no idea that even the hukou is a peculiar characteristic of the PRC – most just assume that all other countries have hukou restrictions too. How can we expect people to support alternatives to the CCP when their horizons have been so narrowly drawn.
Moules,
Right, to be precise, I agree we can’t oversimplify a “fear of luan” upon all Chinese people, as they have more specific concerns and complaints about their environment and “nation”. I also agree that this general hypothesis is given more play and representation in academic circles.
However, like Jenne, I find it conveniently instructive for an important aspect about the relationship between the government and governed in mainland China (even beyond), particularly of the much smaller subset of Chinese people that actually play a more direct role in the governance of China. For these people who are higher on Maslow’s hierarchy, I do think a fear of instability and national weakness is a primary fear, both now and in the past, when it comes to their conscious considerations of the government and alternatives. These are people who are educated enough to have a reasonable understanding of the alternatives and have genuinely placed their bets on reforming the current system vs. throwing it out wholesale to embrace alternatives they aren’t sufficiently confident in.
Are these people nongmin? No. They’re the reasonably well-fed elite who have enough free time to play international politics, ideology, and rhetoric. The nongmin are indeed patriotic and largely ignorant of the alternatives, just as their equivalents are everywhere else.
@Kai – I think that’s largely right. The highly educated minority and those who have benefited from China’s economic reforms the most will be most careful to preserve those gains. If you got rich first in the PRC, then you probably want keep your elevated economic status and get richer: of course you want to protect the status quo. Further, if you have policy influence the ’stability factor’ is one you will major on.
But let’s not present false choices – nobody, but nobody credible is suggesting “throwing the system out wholesale”. The point is that economic reform (outside of being dragged into compliance with WTO obligations that should have been met years ago) has almost stopped. And even the miniscule political reform that looked possible five years ago is dead in the water and has been reversed in places. I’ll just copy a comment from Chinageeks: the ’stability is everything/important’ line is used to further entrench the existing political and economic elite in China (and I’m not talking about white collar workers, I’m talking about the tuanpai and the offspring of Party officials who dominate the landscape here and whose power runs from positions in every Ministry and the monopoly positions of most of the SOEs. These people don’t appear on the Hurun list).
In the broader context, the Chinese people would benefit from further reform, both economic and political. But reform has slowed to a glacial pace. The few reformers out there have to battle arguments that arise largely out of vested self-interest, like ‘we Chinese value stability’. For me, that’s a sad thing.
Moules,
Right, I didn’t think you’d interpret my statement so literally as me intentionally presenting false choices. To me, I’m not yet willing to say reform has objectively slowed to a glacial pace. I am, however, willing to acknowledge and even personally support the sentiment that reform is not nearly as fast as we (both you and I) would like it to be. We’re in a situation where it is impossible to determine an objectively “correct” or “proper” pace of reform. Both sides can be criticized, reasonably and rationally, for wanting the pace to be faster or slower. You give one example, that the “stability is everything/important” line is used to protect the existing elites, preserving their power and privilege. Surely, this is true in many instances, but so are other criticisms. The data set we’re looking at is so large that all of these criticisms have legitimate targets. It’s all true and we bicker about which is “more” true or true for “more” instances when, in reality, it’s actually really hard to determine who is correct…or more correct.
What we do agree upon is that the Chinese people would benefit from further reform. Fortunately, this is something most Chinese people agree with us. I think it is always a sad thing to mask our true interests with false pretenses, but isn’t that how interests command pluralities everywhere?
I think we agree overall in our aims but differ slightly in how we represent the situation. That’s a good start in general.
Very true Kai, we agree on the substance. Interesting that you don’t agree that reform is glacial – what progress have you seen or heard about in the last few years that makes you feel that way? Without wishing to be pointed, you must be seeing things that many interested observers are missing.
Moules,
Frankly, I don’t think this is a productive path to wander down, especially when my point was precisely that people who see the same things have different interpretations of the “speed of change” such things represent. In the end, we’d be throwing examples of progress/change or regression/lack of change at each other trying to nullify each other. It is better for us to remain on common ground, acknowledge that there has been change but differing as to how satisfying it is subjectively.
So the Chinese are masochists. I love the theory. :)