About China blogosphere, travel, and entrepreneurship

Much to the detriment of my productivity, I spend an unwholesome amount of time online verbally sparring with individuals who take extremist political positions on China, whether for or against. Most regular readers of websites and blogs focusing on China-centric topics are familiar with the never-ending commentary that plays out, usually involving arrogant Westerners condemning all that is Chinese on one side, the rabid Chinese nationalists running defense with the best English they can muster on the other, and the nauseating hypocrisy in the middle that seemingly no side can ever get away from.

I sometimes step back and look at this depressing fiasco as a whole, and wonder if we’re not all utter idiots, clutching to the vain hope that our criticisms, insults, explanations, persuasions, or emphatic exhortations will somehow change someone’s mind for what we consider to be the more balanced and the better. It is demoralizing, to say the least, to realize that, yes…we’re all utter idiots.

Take, for instance, the politicization of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. How incredibly aggravating it is to see the Chinese and the Chinese government demand that the rest of the world not politicize their cherished coming-out party, only to see that they themselves have politicized it to the hilt. It may be wholly understandable that they want that control. Yet, it is that precise double-standard coupled with bumbling–or just poorly translated–rhetoric that consistently overshadows the sheer cultural ignorance and insensitivity we see from holier-than-thou activists for whatever movement du jour that has a gripe with China, its government, or all 1.3 billion of its people.

Those on the polarized ends will never see eye-to-eye, nor do they care to. The battle has always been and will always be for those in the middle. I’d like to think I’m in the middle but unlike those on the ends, I think that’s exactly where I and the majority of people should remain. Yes, straddling the fence involves the fence being uncomfortably entrenched up my nether regions but I’ll deal. Why? Because the truth is–according to me, of course–that both sides are right and both sides are wrong. This has been the case and will unfortunately always be the case, and I’d very much prefer to associate myself with the “right” on both sides.

Perhaps,then, the reason I continue to be drawn into these debates is my idealistic–but childish–faith in the marketplace of ideas. I mean, if I know something and I don’t share it, who knows how many countless souls will be swayed into the abyss of ignorance, bias, prejudice, and greater idiocy? Ah, yes, how narcissistic of me but isn’t cherishing dissent in the presence of consent precisely the difference between Western ideals of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and the authoritarian “social harmony” of China?

But in addition to the wonderful ideal of passionate but reasoned discourse leading us all to enlightened decision-making and declared positions is the very practical notion of being practical. Trying to convince your mortal enemy that he or she is an idiot is like China trying to convince the Dalai Lama that he’s the incarnation of evil; it is a waste of time and there could be more productive things to be done like racking up notches or, In China’s case, making sure your truths, lies, and spins are believed by the only people that really matter, your domestic population.

With all of that in mind, I offer you this excerpt of a July 14th article from the New York Times, whom many Chinese largely regard as a biased, Western, anti-China publication simply because it dares to print anything critical of China:

The call he will never forget came for Peter Ueberroth in the middle of the night on May 12, 1984, over a crackling phone line from Beijing. It carried the news he believed would determine the fate of the Olympics, not just the Games he was working to organize in Los Angeles that summer but all the ones beyond.

At the other end of the line was Charles Lee, the man he had sent to persuade the Chinese to send their team to the Olympics for the first time. Ueberroth, the leader of the Los Angeles organizing committee, was asking China to defy a Soviet Union-led boycott that was announced four days earlier. The Soviets said the boycott would keep 100 countries away from the ‘84 Games. If the Soviets succeeded, Ueberroth said flatly, “we were done.”

Salvation came when Lee called and told Ueberroth, “They’re coming.”

As the world prepares for the Beijing Games in August, that moment is all but lost in the history of the Olympics, when the winds shifted and carried the Games away from a political bludgeon in the cold war to the combination of athletic and commercial success they have become since.

Ueberroth, now 70 and the chairman of the United States Olympic Committee, will lead the American team into China with a deep sense of gratitude. He believes China saved the Olympics.

So maybe the United States and George W. Bush, the fantastic man that he is, attending the 2008 Beijing Games isn’t really about kowtowing to China. Maybe its about something else and hopefully something more…human.

I know China has, in many frustrating ways, sabotaged its own Games with their own immature insecurities. I know it is difficult to put up with the politics that inevitable surround the Olympics, especially when it involves a country, government, or citizenship that has difficulty dealing with the negative attention and criticism that always comes. The dialogue and debates should continue, ideally in the spirit of greater mutual understanding and mutual growth, but maybe we should pause for a moment to reflect upon an Olympics separate from all the nonsense. If the British and German soldiers of World War I could put down their guns to play a game of football for Christmas, can’t we put aside our agendas and share a moment of peace for the Olympics?

I mean, I hear they’ve got some breathtaking architecture in Beijing. It’d be a shame to miss it.

As a pseudo-geek, my RSS Reader includes a subscription to the almighty TechCrunch, an influential blog that covers the internet and tech industry. I woke up today to an entry about Jason Calacanis retiring from blogging and now choosing to only write to a mailing list of about 1000 of his followers. In his first e-mail, he elaborates on this decision and criticizes a potential problem of blogging when it results in “trolls and haters” taking over the discussion:

Why should we all build our homes and give residence to the trolls under them? Comments on blogs inevitably implode, and we all accept it under the belief that “open is better!” Open is not better….We’ve put the wisdom of the deranged on the same level as the wisdom of the wise.

She too has felt the harsh mob mentality, also known as “the wisdom of the crowds.” For the record, crowds are really frackin’ stupid and to put your stock in crowds is about as bright as putting your faith in a dictator-they’ll love you for as long as they feel like it, then they’ll ripe[sic] you apart without mercy.

For some reason, reading this reminded me of what Kaiser Kuo¹ at Ogilvy Digital Watch wrote about China’s Facebook-clone Xiaonei² and their new open platform policies. Reflecting upon the legion of developers angry that Xiaonei’s “open” policies actually ended up NOT being so open and thus negatively affecting their plans for making money through Xiaonei, Kuo wrote:

Tangos³ suggests that there really isn’t a culture of openness, but rather one of control, with Chinese Internet companies, and I agree that’s the case. In this case this tendency is reinfoced by something even more basic to Chinese culture, Internet company or whatever: ruthless pragmatism.

Of course, Calacanis and Kuo are talking about two very different things. Calacanis supports his decision to exit the blogosphere by citing the degradation of dialogue in the face of capricious crowds. Kuo (and Tangos) attributes Xiaonei’s tight-fisted policies to a basic tendency in Chinese culture to regard control controlling your options and controlling how others should coexist with you whenever possible as being pragmatic.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Calacanis’ rationalization has a certain technocratic air about it, which is ironically reminiscent of the Chinese central government. Like Calacanis, the CCP government too doesn’t put much stock in crowds, especially crowds with “frackin’ stupid” ideas that aren’t government approved. Like Calacanis, the CCP government fears the crowds, regarding them suspiciously being one step away from becoming an uncontrollable mob ready to end their rule disrupt “social harmony” and tear apart the country.

Therein lies the complex rationalizations for the necessity of the Chinese central government to control the Chinese people, whether it means increased patriotic education for splittist TIbetans, suppressing grieving parents who lost their children in the Sichuan earthquake, or employing grassroots public relations specialists to shape public opinion with propagandic posts and comments throughout the internet. The Chinese government doesn’t need to show Tibetan young men cutting out chunks of ass-meat or show how the Weng’an mass riot was ultimately a 30,000-strong mob mobilized by rumors and lies. All they need is a video of Cantonese teenagers raping and beating up a single, naked girl and the ensuing public commotion to show that, yes, people are inherently evil, can’t be trusted, and will do really “frackin’ stupid” things when in groups, much less crowds and mobs. So, society needs government to control and control, itself, is a pragmatic necessity for the welfare and continued development of the Chinese nation.

China, like Calacanis, isn’t too keen on letting dissidents and westerners “trolls and haters” take over the discussion. After all, the last time it happened, China became a whore to Western imperialist powers. As a social, poltiical, and economic entity, a CCP-governed China will only be as open as it chooses to be. Just as Xiaonei not wanting to be OpenSocial, China doesn’t want to be a Western democracy. China’s unapologetic embrace of control, like Xiaonei, is about ruthless pragmatism, for good or for ill.

For most Chinese, society is ultimately inefficient, injustices happen, and there is no Holy God in the afterlife to give you your due. “Westerners,” ever confident and optimistic in their socio-political ideologies, often miss that. The concession that governmental control of society is necessary is certainly a defining characteristic of Chinese culture, a culture that has, for thousands of years, hoped for benevolent governance from enlightened individuals to guarantee the most basic right hope of being able to eat, sleep, and make babies in peace.

Of course, the other defining characteristic of Chinese culture is that it is always everyone else–and not oneself–that makes government control and other necessary evils, well, necessary.

Notes
¹ About the only other person in the world I know of that shares my name. Sucker.
² For those who don’t know, “Xiaonei” literally means “inside campus,” reminding us of Facebook originally being open only to university students, you know, before they made it big.
³ Now, “Tangos” is a cool name, far cooler than “Kaiser.” It has more “Spanish street brawler” and less “German world domination.”

China’s Zheng Jie, was finally eliminated from the Wimbledon’s women’s singles tennis yesterday, losing to #6 Serena Williams (USA). This was following a historic run that saw her upsetting top seeded Ana Ivanovic’s (Serbia) in Round 3 and defeating #18 Nicole Vaidisova (Czech Republic) in Tuesday’s Quarter-Finals. Ranked #133 in the world, she entered the prestigious event as a wild card and became the first Chinese player to break into the Semi-Finals.

The Chengdu native’s surprise performance captivated a nation, known more for table tennis, as Chinese around the country tuned into late-night live broadcasts both on TV and on their computers. I watched the repeatedly rain-interrupted game on the computer last night. I probably would’ve gotten this up earlier had I not immediately gone to sleep, disappointed as I was by Zheng Jie losing the tie-breaker to Serena…with an anti-climactic double-fault. Dammit. Bursting with pride, China Daily even has a poll up today asking if Zheng will win a medal at August’s Olympic Games.

In the news:

• Zheng Jie granted Wimbledon Open wildcard
• Zheng Jie beats top-seeded Ana Ivanovic at Wimbledon
• Zheng makes history, to help quake-hit hometown
• Zheng misses tie-breaker and Wimbledon final

I’m getting a little embarrassed that so many of my posts here have been prompted by those fine folk over at China Law Blog and, embarassingly, this post won’t be an exception. Dan cited an article from Wednesday’s Shanghai Daily reporting that the number of credit cards in China have nearly doubled, up to 104.73 million in circulation nation-wide. That’s 1/3 of the United States population and just imagine how many credit cards those 300 million debt-ridden over-consuming Americans have…each!

While that news in of itself is squarely in the “hm, that’s interesting” category, it immediately reminded me of my night out at the movies the day before, where I went to watch Dreamworks’ Kung Fu Panda (功夫熊猫)…for the second time.

Now, watching movies in China on the big screen at a theatre or cinema (as opposed to watching it off a bootleg DVD) is still relatively expensive for most locals. On average, it costs 70-80 RMB per ticket, comparable to American box office ticket prices of 9-10 USD. Given that necessities like a filling meal can be had for under 10 RMB and the average monthly income (in Shanghai) is still 2000-3000 RMB, watching the latest screening is an exorbitant luxury. Therefore, as you can imagine, the cinemas here aren’t exactly packed even on weekends or when big blockbusters debut. Watching a movie here can be a very lonely experience. Compared to the lines, mobs, and subsequent front-row, whiplash seating often associated with watching the latest movie in the States, I often wonder just how the cinemas in China manage to stay in business with so little patronage.

Perhaps one method these cinemas use to stay afloat is by offering half-price tickets on certain weekdays, most commonly Tuesdays. It also brings bourgeois amusements within reach of the proletariat masses. Having lived in China for so long where I can purchase so many things for so little, I’ve become something of a cheapskate and now measure all Western prices by how many meals off the street I could instead buy in China. Just earlier this month, when visiting Los Angeles, I felt like a royal ass for thinking the Chipotle burrito I treated an old friend to was an extravagant sum of money. But hey, when in Rome, do as the Romans do, right? So, whenever I declare a movie to be worth more than a Bit Torrent download, I’ll go to the cinemas here in China and I’ll usually go on half-price Tuesdays because 40 RMB is still 50% better than 80 RMB.

Normally, even half-price Tuesdays rarely brings out the crowds. So imagine my surprise when I walked into massive lines at the box office this past Tuesday. At first, I figured it was all due to the awesome bodacity of pandas and kung-fu. After all, despite utterly ridiculous attempts to prevent the movie from being shown in China on the pretenses of it being from Beijing Olympics traitor Steven Spielberg and the culture-thieving, Sharon Stone spawning Hollywood, the movie has been very well-received in China. The Chinese were probably out in force to support a movie that paid homage to two wildly popular icons of Chinese culture. Great date movie too.

But the teeming crowds weren’t just out because Kung Fu Panda was promising entertainment…no, the teeming crowds were out because so many of them were armed with new-fangled Ping An Bank credit cards. In what can only be described as a fit of ingenious marketing, recent applicants for Ping An Bank credit cards are entitled to use their cards to watch movies at the cinema on any day for only 10 RMB a ticket. It is the perk of the century, single-handedly invigorating the cinema business with a deluge of movie-going masses clamoring for a taste of the high life.

I heard about this awesome deal weeks ago and despite strong entreaties from a friend that I apply for a card, I just haven’t been able to shake the probably unwarranted unease I feel towards applying for credit in China. It irked her to no end that she couldn’t apply because she already ruined her credit by being stupid while I could but simply refused to do so. Vindicated by the lines of people happily waiting to use their cards to purchase 10 RMB tickets, she slammed me with her incredulity yet again. My only solace was that there was only one ridiculously long line for those using Ping An credit cards and four very short non-promotional lines for the rest of us. Suckers.

Even so, we had to wait two hours for the next showing with any decent seats left. It was the closest the Chinese cinema experience has ever gotten to what I took for granted in the States, and the credit goes to pandas and Ping An Bank kung fu.

So, what do you think? Is the 10 RMB movie ticket promotion worth getting another credit card I don’t plan on using? 

UPDATE 07/15/08: Due to the unexpected overwhelming popularity of this promotional deal and the crowds of Chinese hoping to exploit it to the max, many cinemas have begun forbidding the purchase of 10 RMB movie tickets using the Ping An credit card until 5-10 days after new movies are released. The promotion itself was only to last for a year, and it is rumored that new Ping An credit cards in the future will move to a points-based rewards system instead of instant discounts. One card-holder stood in line for over three hours to purchase his 10 RMB tickets for Kung Fu Panda, a 1.5 hour movie. Fail.

Wheee! We’re back! …in rainy, dreary Hong Kong. Let’s get to it.

SESSION 6: Society, Continuity & Change
Moderator/Discussant: Jack Qiu, Assistant Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

“Coal and the Internet in China Digital governance and politics of markets”
by Jesper Shlaeger, Ph.D Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

• Coal and internet? How’re they related?
• The coal industry in China was one of the last vestiges of a planned economy. Every year, coal was allocated at a summit.
• Change of coal industry to being market-driven was partially influenced by the development and availability of internet technology.

“The Online Game Industry in China: A Preliminary Observation on the Political Economic Structure.”
by Chung Peichi, Assistant Professor, Communications and New Media Programme, National University of Singapore.

• Online gaming industry in China, South Korea, and Singapore.
• Video Game Spending Growth grew 35.1% in 2002, 19.1% in 2008, estimated 5.3% by 2011.
• Will still be lower than Japan and South Korea in total money spent.
• Research Question: What is the meaning of globalization in the Asian context?
• Research Question: What is the strucutre in the online game industry in China?
• Research Question: The local industry dynamics?
• Rapid increase in local production of online games in China: 61 games in 2002, up to 203 games in 2007, with many of them being ported over from Korea but locally operated.
• In 2002, game developers were usually the US and Korea with China being the Publisher and Distributor.
• By 2007, many games were developed, published, and distributed within China itself. 
• Government agencies: Ministry of Infomration INdustry, Ministry of Culture, General Administration of Press and Publications.
• Corporate Strategies of various China game companies:
• Shanda - releases international titles in China.
• NetEase: Developes in-house games (80%).
• The9: Released World of Warcraft (98%).
• Hybridized Games: games that are thematically a blend of multiple real-world cultures (i.e. costume design merging Asian and European motifs).

“Virtual-World Unrest and the Gamer Rights Protection Movement in China”
by Matthew Chew, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Hong Kong Baptist University.  

• Interested as a sociologist, sociologies consider internet to be the single most powerful phenomenon driving modern society.
• Presents Chronology of Gamer Activism. Wow, don’t piss off addicted gamers who are willing to protest, vandalize, and physically kick ass in the real world over virtual game issues.
• Gamer grievances: Rent-seeking activities, mistreatment of virtual property theft, mistreatment of duping problems, termination of individual online games, technicaly instability (game crashes, lag), and “corrupted, authoritatrian rule of virtual worlds” by game corporations.
• Theoretical Implications: Game corporations as media businesses in the real-world but authoritarian states of virtual-worlds. Gamers as real-world middle-class cultural consumers but grassroot, politically active virtual-world citizens. So the natural thought progression would be: Will virtual world activism (demand for rights, freedoms, fairness, stability, etc.) spill over into the real world? Can virtual world gamers become a source of real-world political change?
• On the other hand, people often retreat into virtual worlds precisely to avoid the limitations they face in the real world. Political or social activism in virtual-worlds, therefore, may only be people grasping to protect their fantasies, viewing the gaming corporations that provide the framework for these fantasies as being far more malleable and subject to the people’s will than real world governments and intitutions. Is online gaming as a commercial transaction premised fundamentally on customer satisfaction for continued business significantly different from the social contract between the government and the governed?

Discussion:

• All papers show Internet-driven social change, whether in coal industries or entertainment gaming.

SESSION 7: Law, Regulation and Governance
Moderator: Peter Yu, Professor & Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School
Discussant: Doreen Weisenhaus, Director of the Media Law Project & Assistant Professor, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong

“Regulation of Internet: technical, normative or cultural conception; a cross comparison between Europe and China.”
by Olivier Arifon, Assistant Professor, Robert Schuman University / CERIME laboratory, Strasbourg France.

“Government & Online Video in China: WeTube, not YouTube?”
by Duncan Clark, Chairman, BDA.  

• Massive VC funding of Chinese internet companies. 
• Google acquisition of YouTube an inspiration for Chinese look-alike me-toos. 
• Hard to determine who is winning amongst the top 3 online video sharing sites: Tudou, youku, and 56.
• Online video sites depend almost exclusively on advertising, but none of them are making much money so far. High bandwidth costs therefore make ongoing capital funding critical.
• Regulatory uncertainties will not go away. Traditional media such as state owned television broadcasters will use regulatory interventions to protect their position.
• Larger issue than regulatory uncertainty is the lack of profitability in the industry (server costs, bandiwdth costs, growing but low advertising revenues).
• Piracy still a main driver of demand for these sites.

Norms and the Legitimacy of Law in China: the Case of ‘Black Internet Cafes’
by Johan Lagerkvist, Research Fellow, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 

• …

“Myths and Reality: Too Little or Too Much Freedom for Mainland Netizens?”
by Anne Cheung, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.  

• dsdsdToo Littel Freedom or Too Much Speech?
• Cyberbullying: Intentional, deliberate, and atargeted attack on a private citizen in the form of abusive, threatening, harassing speech, that may be recurring or repeated, over a consistent period of time, by an anonymous individual or group.
• Chinese laws protect against infringements of reputation and imply that ISPs are responsible for controlling online content.
• Suggests that the best way to prevent “cyberbullying” is to make ISPs liable.

Discussion:

• Yesterday, Rebecca MacKinnion showed us that censorship at the provider level (in her case, blog providers) was inconsistent, subject the subjective interpretations of the employees at those providers. Even if we ignore all of the issues about defining cyberbullying and the rights of free speech, how would Anne Cheung’s proposal be feasibly carried out?
• The CIRC IRC channel lit up with Anne Cheung’s presentation and quite a few good questions were asked of her, to which she conceded that she didn’t have all the answers. So, the age-old question between freedom of expression and (perhaps) the “right” to or of privacy remains?
• Interestingly, none of the examples Anne Cheung gave referenced the recent online “shaming” by Chinese netizens against perceived multinational iron-roosters with regards to Sichuan Earthquake donations. Under her prescription, could we have relied upon the law and the ISPs technically bound by these laws to stop public dissatisfaction with the charitable or lack of charitable actions by others?

SESSION 8: DISCUSSION: Internet, Tibet, and the Olympics
Moderator: Jeremy Goldkorn, Founder, Danwei.org
Discussion with bloggers Roland Soong of EastSouthWestNorth and Isaac Mao of CNBlog.org

• What happened on the Chinese Internet in 2008? Top picks: Snow Storms, Tibet, Olympics, Earthquake…
• However, according to traffic spikes at ESWN, was Sexy Photo Gate (the Edison Chen photo scandal) the biggest thing?
• The deluge of traffic from mainland China over the Edisen Chen scandal resulted in HK websites trying to get themselves blocked by Chinese GFW by posting Tiananmen 6/4 material.
• Roland talks about Tibet coverage becoming anti-CNN movement.
• Olympic Torce Relay becomes Carrefour Boycott.
• Civilian journaists are local sources who are great at providing tips. However, they cannot follow through to verify. Most cases require mainstream media to devote resources to follow through. But mainstream media also need the eyes and ears of the civilian journalists to tip them. This is a symbiotic relationship.
• Chinese netizens are heterogeneous and constantly evolving.
• Size matters because 0.01% of 210 million Chinese netizens is 21,000.
• External events are change agents, especially so far in 2008.
• What next…?
• Isaac Mao reiterates the new symbiotic relationship between traditional media and social/civilian media.

SESSION 9: Blogging and online discourse
(Part 1) Moderator: Rebecca MacKinnon, Assistant Professor, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

“Authoritarian Deliberation: Public Deliberation in China”
by Jiang Min, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Studies, UNC-Charlotte. 

• Key Questions:
• Can public deliberation take place in less democratic countries? Yes.
• Do countries have to democratized first in orer to achieve public deliberation? No.
• …
• Chinese civil society and media are dominated by governemnet, and increasingly commercial influence.
• Chinese public deliberative insitiutions tend to be voluntary, dispersive, and less institutionalized.
• Conclusion: EMerging empirical evidence of public deliberationin China.  

“The Rise of Online Public Opinion and Its Political Impact”
by Xiao Qiang, Adjunct Professor, University of California at Berkeley.

• Chinese adverse to being direct with opinions. Hence propensity and pervasiveness of “zheng hua fan shuo” or saying precisely the opposite of what you mean.

Political Discourse in the Chinese Blogosphere: A Quantitative Approach”
by Ashley Esraey, Assistant Professor, Middlebury College. ”

• Research questions: Do blogs threaten the state’s ability to control access to political info in China? How different is political discourse in blogs compared to that of official media? To what extend does propaganda exist in the blogosphere? How popular are political bloggers? How interlinked are bloggers?
• Studying Blog Content: Methodological concerns: How to selecte a random or representative sample relating to politics? Could content analysis be used on the medium? What kind of protocol could capture the nuances of blogger’s language?
• Newspapers used as reference to compare blogs against. 
• Presence of pluralism and criticism more common in Chinese blogs than Chinese newspapers. Presence of national andlocal propaganda far less common in Chinese blogs than Chinese newspapers.
• Criticism in Chinese blogs approaches the levels found in Taiwanese and USA newspapers.
• Principal Findings:
• Bloggers frequently criticize corporations, often gripe about national affairs, and occassionally criticize top leaders.
• Cautious Criticism: postings that are critical often cite governmental sources aka pracice ”Rightful Resisteance.” 
• Overall, political discourse is much freer, debate more frequent, and much less propaganda.
• 25% of bloggers in sample had moderate to high traffice (250 hits or more per posting).
• Inferences:
• “Hidden transcripts” go public in new political discourse. Meaning what we used to not say is now easier to say because we have the an easier means to do so.
• Vibrant blog content could boost political knowledge.
• Interlinkages among bloggers increase the resources for political opposition.
• A small number of bloggers have shown a tendency to champion popular interest.
• Harbinger of “higher popular participation” in politics, not necessarily a “revolution.”

Discussion:

• Rebecca MacKinnion on Jiang Min’s work: Challenges the persistent, often Western, discounting of political discourse and deliberation in China simply because it does not operate under the framework of a “multi-party” system, where the notion that China is a “Communist” state fails to acknowledge that the internet (amongst other things and mediums) are enabling more popular participating in political and social matters in China.
• Does increased public deliberation in China actually prolong the existence of the one-party state, so that continuous, even minimal, improvement and empowerment becomes the excuse that a revolution is unnecessary? “We don’t need to change so long as we’re improving.”
• Ashley Esraey: Blogging may not result in revolution but it will at help people become more comfortable with expressing themselves.
• Comment from audience: The internet is taking from the government the monopoly to shape public opinion.
• Declaration of academic imperialism from the audience!
• Ashley Esraey: Research finding: Most critical blog postings made between midnight and 4am.

(Part 2) Moderator: Hu Yong, Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Peking University

“Crossing the River by Groping for Stones: From Free Expression to Shared Meanings to Collective Political Action in China’s Blogosphere.”
by Peter Marolt, Ph.D Candidate, University of Southern California. 

• Chinese continue to believe that the power of the individual is ultimately limited but do recognize the emergence of blogging as a tool of expression.
• The Process of Social Learning: “Everything starts with free thinking.” Next step is “free expression.”

“What Chinese bloggers blog - examining the top 100 weblogs in China.”
by Hsu Chiung-wen, Assistant Professor, Department of Radio & Television & Graduate Program, College of Communication, National Chengchi University.  

• Research on Chinese-language blogs is rare, of which most focus on the censorship by China’s government and the democratizaing effects of blogging under a deterministic view of technology leading to societal and political developments. So do we have a lot of “research” that boils down to finding what we’re looking for?
• Compares the content of blog posts from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, sampled from the top 100 blogs off Blog Look.
• Findings: Technology, celebrity, and leisure blogs occupy 80% more of the top 100. No individual blog dedicated to political topics.

SESSION 10: ROUNDTABLE - Chinese journalism in the Internet age
Chair and key presenter: Qian Gang, Co-Director, China Media Project, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong
Moderator/facilitator: David Bandurski, Research Associate, China Media Project, Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

Panel of Chinese journalists and bloggers:

• Hu Yong, Associate Professor, Peking University
• Li Yong-gang, Assistant Director, Universities Service Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
• Song Zheng, Editor-in-chief, Tianya
• Zhang Dong-sheng, Editor-in-chief (Editorial Department), QQ.com
• Zhai Minglei, Editor-in-chief, 1 Bao

Left to right: ZHAI Minglei, ZHANG Dong-sheng, LI Yonggang, and SONG Zheng.

• David Bandurski asks how the government has been controlling the social internet recently. SONG Zheng responds that it isn’t convenient for him to answer.

Exciting panel but as the event has been running late and my flight back to Shanghai looms, I have to make a speedy exit. For further coverage, head on over here. 

A lot of last-minute scrambling went into getting me here to cover the 2008 Chinese Internet Research Conference @ Hong Kong University. I’ll try to go into those details later just to vent, but the important thing is that I’m here.

This event promises to be an interesting affair, with the express goal of deepening our understanding of the interaction between Chinese society and the Internet, as well as discovering the perspectives and insights of scholars studying this field.

I’ll be live-blogging this event as it unfolds. As with any academic conference, there’s bound to be a ton of research papers loaded down with with statistical jargon and the corresponding stilted academic details that seem relevant and interesting only within the ivory tower. That’s fine. Now, I’ll be taking notes and updating as we go along. If you’re following along at the same time, it may get confusing. I’ll revise for clarity and coherence with every free moment I get, as well as highlight any points I find interesting enough to mention. Additional live-blogging coverage by the fine people shown below can be found at the official CIRC blog, and I’ll be honest, so far they’ve been far faster at absorbing and regurgitating the presentations than I have been.

Note: Most italicized text are my own random comments, not those of the presenters.

Let’s get to it…

SESSION 1: New Scholars Panel: Survey Findings

1. “Don’t Blame the Internet Anymore! - A Revisit to the Internet’s Influence on Traditional Media Use and Sociability”
by Peng Tai-Quan and Jonathan Zhu, Ph.D Candidate and Professor, City University of Hong Kong.

• Existing academic research regarding the Internet vs Traditional media falls into camps: 1) Displacement: Internet use replaces Traditional Media use, and 2) Complementary: Internet use increases Traditional Media use.
• Existing acadmeic research regarding Internet vs. Sociability can also be defined with two perspectives: 2) Pessimistic: Internet use decreases offline social interactions, and 2) Optimistic: Internet use improves an individual’s social interaction scope. Pessimistic: More World of Warcraft = Less Friday night pen and paper Dungeons and Dragons games. Optimistic: Making new friends and chasing skirt by stalking them on MySpace/Facebook first.
• One of the problems with analyzing these issues is that “[w]e live in a complex, multivariate world…” In other words, the world is so complex with so many variables that trying to figure it out is ultimately pointless. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Internet Project uses a multitude of variables in its methodology to draw conclusions about how Internet usage correlates with or impacts Traditional Media consumption and an individual’s offline social life. Amusingly, the variables for measuring “sociability” were defined as “chatting, exercising, and shopping with friends/family. Okay, I get chatting, but exercising and shopping? Are your serious?
• The results show that internet use does somewhat conflict with consumption of traditional media. This would be reasonable so long as the information absorbed through either are significantly similar to become redundant. Watching a sports game on television is qualitatively different from following updated box scores on the internet.
• However, a distinction needs to be made highlighting individuals who are simply voracious consumers of media, whether online or offline. For such individuals, internet use and consumption of traditional media are complementary rather than supplementary.
• Results also show that internet use did not seem to have much of an effect on the user’s offline sociability. At the end of the day, porn and cybersex is no substitute for the real thing.

2. “Perceived Credibility of Online Health Information in China: A Survey of College Students in Ganzhou”
by Zeng Jie and Zhou Xiang, M.A. Candidate and Professor, Cheung Kong School of Journalism and Communication, Shantou University.

• Their research asks three questions: 1. Why do college students search for health information online? Self-diagnosis of STDs by browsing symptom pictures? 2. How do they perceive the credibility of the information they find? Are they affected by their gender or experience with the internet? 3. What factors affect these perceptions of credibility? How does the college student’s own medical knowledge or their involvement in the searching itself affect these perceptions?
• In conducting their research, they distributed 480 questionnaires to students at universities, vocational colleges, and medical schools, out of which they received 388 responses that they then stratified by school and gender. Is it me or does the number 8 appear disproportionately more whenever the Chinese are involved?
• Some results are reasonably expected. For example, college students search online simply because it is easy and convenient to access a multitude and variety of information. Being female or male did not seem to affect how a student interpreted the credibility of the information they found online.
• With regards to the third question, they analyzed the following factors: expertness, website function, website presentation, personalization, surface authority.

3. “Uses and development of the Internet in less developed regions”
by Li Xuefang, M.A. Candidate, Communication University of China.

• How are those in less developed, rural areas using or the web productively or view the web as a tool for productivity, as opposed to just using the web for amusement (i.e. listening to music, watching videos, etc.).

4. “Information and Expression in Web 2.0: A Study of Internet Users in Shanghai”
by Zhou Baohua, Lecturer, Journalism Department, Fudan University.

• …

Concluding Session Commentary and Discussion:
Francis Lee, Assistant Professor of City University of Hong Kong, provides commentary on the forgoing research papers/studies:

1. Technically good study, but may be better if there was more discussion of the underlying conceptional arguments, such as time-displacement (more internet = less traditional media and offline social interaction) and efficiency (is internet more efficient for communicating information and facilitating social interaction)

2. Very interesting

3. Difficult to comment on as a big-city Hong Konger who doesn’t have rural life experience. Suggests elaborating further the rural context to help others better understand the usefulness or usage of the internet by rural populations and the other statistics gathered in her research.

4. What is the “concept” of Web 2.0?

Overall: All papers suggest that Chinese are increasingly sophisticated internet users. Yeah…but is anyone actually suggesting otherwise or care to suggest otherwise?

SESSION 2: New Scholars Panel: Comparative Perspectives

1. “Chinese-written Internet: Diversity and Segregation”
by Zhou Baohua, Lecturer, Journalism Department, Fudan University.

• What is Chinese internet? How is it different from China’s Internet? Despite the utter simlistic obviousness of this distinction, it is remarkable how this is lost amongst the vast majority when it comes to viewing the “Chinese.”
• Chinese internet is diverse, while China’s internet is increasingly segregated from the Chinese internet due to government interference, such as the Great Firewall (GFW). Chinese internet is NOT homogenous, despite
• Gang Tai Wen Hua (港台文化) = Hong Kong Taiwan Culture, is it bad for the youth of China? Because, you know, they’ve had too much degenerate and debaucherous British and American influence.

2. “Virtual Jingpo: A Jingpo/Kachin Techno-community?”
by Daphne Richet-Cooper, Intern, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China.

• Jingpo/Kachin = a transnational (China/Burma) group, separated by a national border but still the same social group.
• Both Chinese and Burmese governments are repressive towards minority groups. Well…that’s debatable.
• Although they are technically the same cultural group, the internet reflects and influences them to diverge and emphasis self-identity upon their geographic location and thus national lines.

3. “The situation characteristics of language on the Internet.”
by Chen Yenling, Assistant Professor, Chinese Culture University, Taiwan.

• Communications online (including SMS) can differ from communication offline. Is this like saying “L-O-L” in real life?
• How is internet language arising from growing up in the internet culture contributing to generational gaps or gaps between those “in the know” versus those who aren’t.
• Abbreviations of words like “u” for “you” is common on the internet. What about the rampant use of casual internet abbreviations and lingo in other situations/contexts, such as professional correspondence? This is common to the youth, recent graduates, but not limited to them.
• “3166″ = Sounds like “sayonara” when spoken in Mandarin Chinese. What about “914?” A cookie for the first person to explain what this means in the comments.
• Popular culture affects what words we use to express ideas. Example given of using “Brokeback Mountain” to represent “homosexuality.” It’d be cool if she started talking about the use of images as responses/comments. Even better, cat pictures. Moar!

4. “Identification, Monitoring and State Extractive Capacity: China’s Golden Tax Project”
by Ou Shujun, Ph.D Candidate, Department of Government and Public Administration, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

• Use of internet to improve tax collection. Hehehehe.
• How can the government use the internet to improve governance as opposed to how the government can control the internet?

Concluding Session Commentary: Jack Qiu, Assistant Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

• Regarding the Daphne Richet-Cooper’s paper: Very interesting and full of potential, we should be paying more attention to ethnic minorities. Is the marginalization or erasure of minorities simply part of the process of nation-building or development? What about the difference between minorities within a country and minorities within a country (Xinjiang, Tu, Hui, Tibetans) that is represented by a external, separate state *Turks, Khazaks, Thai, Koreans, etc.).

Question from the audience to all the panelists: A minority can use the internet to create a disproportionate representation of reality. How have these studies corrected for this phenomenon?

SESSION 3: Presentation & Discussion: Chinese Internet User Survey

Roland Soong, of EastSouthNorthWest fame:

General Population > Internet users > Bloggers > Blogger Segments

Segmentation of interest: Psychographics

Three identifiable segments (not all-inclusive): Angry young people, followers, and progressives.

Usage of data from 144 million internet users.

Bloggers represent 0.74% of the general population. Of bloggers, females are more likely to be bloggers than males. Bloggers tend to visit portals and read blogs far more than general internet users. 80% of bloggers read blogs, compared to only 4% of the average internet user.

Deborah Fallows, Pew Internet Project: What has China’s earthquake done to its internet? What have we seen and what should we look for?

• China’s internet: two old myths and a new reality:
• Myth 1: China’s internet is all about entertainment. The new opiate of the masses?
• New Reality: China’s interent is about much, much more, as reavealed by the Chinese internet’s response to the Sichuan earthquake.
• Myth 2: China’s internet users chafe under government internet control and management. Definitely a myth. “The West” certainly chafes more than the Chinese themselves.
• New Reality: Could myth #2 actually become true, in a new online world triggered by the earthquake? Whereas Myth 2 was largely a false impression born out of the Western-projected values, could the widespread tragic events, media coverage, and government response surrounding the earthquake actually prompt Chinese to become more aware and critical of the government’s control of the internet?
• How can we compare the China internet response to the earthquake vs. the American internet response to 9/11?
• China’s internet responded to the earthquake as the immediate and first responder, an aggregator of content, creating of new applications, and a humanizer. What was the voice of the post-earthquake China internet? More unified voice (of shock), more humane and tempered, more spiritual/religious, more shocking images and videos (really?), more unedited and less censored.

Roland Soong comments that he became increasingly frustrated with the information on the internet after the earthquake. It is good at identifying problems but not good at providing solutions or answers. Certain answers were still best gotten through the mainstream media who had the means to find answers, by sending in investigative teams, etc. Soong expresses his doubt as to whether the internet is capable of providing the quality of information/answers that the mainstream media can. So is this the age battle between a marketplace of ideas and the confidence in authority?

Obvious response and question from the audience: What about mainstream/traditional media websites? Roland Soong responds that he mispoke and clarifies the issue as the difference between professionals and citizen journalists/amateurs/the unwashed masses.

Question from audience: Are people turning to the internet a representation of the inadequacy or censorship of mainstream/traditional media? Roland Soon responds that he agrees, and that his website features a lot of information and news translated from Chinese news sources that the Western media tends to pick up a day or two later.

SESSION 4: Myths vs. Realities

This is the theme of this year’s conference. Is the internet a social phenomenon, a marketing phenomenon, an advertising phenomenon? How we understand the internet can be shaped by different groups, by marketers or even academics.

1. “Discussion of methods and perspectives used in Internet research”
by Bu Wei, Professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

• Low fieldwork done.
• Perspectives usually from government or academics.

2. “The Great Firewall as Iron Curtain 2.0: the Implications of China’s Internet most dominant metaphor for U.S. Foreign Policy.”
by Lokman Tsui, Ph.D Candidate, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania.

• “Do you believe that China will inevitably change with the Internet?”
• Results of the Zogby International telephone survey in the United States on Jan 31, 2007: 43% yes.
• Contextual presumptions reflected by this question is that change hasn’t happened and that we’re thinking specifically about political issues such as free speech and other freedoms.
• Is the Great Firewall the explanation for assumptions or perceptions of internet-driven change (or lack thereof) in China?
• Lots of information about US governmental action targetting China internet interests.

3. “The Chinese Diasporic Cyberspace: Overseas Chinese Essentialism vs. Hybrid Transnationalism”
by Jens Damm, Assistant Professor, Freie Universität Berlin.

• Historically, the Chinese language itself, especially in mass media, linked ethnic Chinese around the world and linked them back to their homeland (mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). Think of Chinese parents in America watching Chinese channels nightly through cable.
• Today, how is the internet helping link and diversify the Chinese diaspora?
• Essentialist websites: Focus on the “essential/eternal/unchanging nature of Chinese culture.” Often PRC academic and museum websites.
• Chinese cyber nationalism.
• The role of the internet and new technologies with connecting the Chinese diaspora.

Questions from the audience:

• What term should we use to refer to China’s internet regulation/censorship other than the Great Firewall if it is such a problematic Cold War-esque term? Lokman Tsui replies that as an academic he’s good at finding problems but not solutions.
• Jeremy Goldkorn, of danwei.org fame, makes another failed attempt to advance “Net Nanny” to replace “Great Firewall.”
• Jens Damm emphasizes his attempt to give a “post-modern” definition of “diaspora” as opposed to the “diaspora” laden with Jewish connotations.

SESSION 5: Roundtable - Corporate Action and Responsibility

Moderated by Rebecca MacKinnon, Assistant Professor, Journalism & Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong, featuring…

• Issac Mao, Co-founder, CNBlog.org
• Charles Mok, Chairman, Internet Society of Hong Kong.
• Ching Chiao, VP Community Relations, DotAsia.
• Joshua Rosenzweig, Manager of Research and Programs, Duihua Foundation
• Duncan Clark, Chairman, BDA

Discussion:

Questions from CIRC 2005:

• The Internet is changing China..but how is China changing the Internet? Many discuss the former, far fewer explore the latter…
• Role of business: What is the role of Internet and telecom companies–both foreign and Chinese–in helping to shape China’s standards, practices, and regulatory norms? Points at Cisco, Yahoo, Google, etc…
• Companies are sandwiched between governments and users.
• Quote: “Ultimately, to succeed in China, businesses must assume the goals of the Communist Party as their own.” - “Mr. X,” a “foreign media entrepreneur based in China” in the Far Eastern Economic Review.
• Foreign companies sayL “We have no choice…we have to abude by the same rules that apply to Chinese companies, or we can’t do business here.”
• Question: Is it really true that they have absolutely no choice whatsoever? Obviously not. Are companies acknowledging that they have choices?
• Rebecca MacKinnion has been doing some blog censorship testing, by posting various content across 17 blog hosts to see how they if and how they censor.
• Different websites have different censoring methods, and sometimes would even censor content from China’s own Xinhua news.
• Can we frame this issue as “consumer rights” instead of falling into the traditional “Cold War” framework of interpretation?
• Race to the bottom? As the China market becomes increasingly important, will we see companies and standards become more “Chinese?”
• MacKinnion ask Isaac Mao: Can this “consumer rights” perspective be applicable in China?
• Isaac Mao: Hard to know what the government wants, since there isn’t necessarily a single “government” player. Chinese people not yet comfortable with the concept of consumer rights. Google is so “jian.”
• MacKinnion ask Joshua Rosenzweig: Is there a solution for companies to determine what information they can or cannot hand to the government?
• Joshua Rosenzweig: Companies need to know what to do, a policy, with regards to what they’re going to do when the government comes knocking on your door. It can’t be US-centric, and must reflect the actual situation in China. Uses case of Yahoo and Shi Tao. Chinese constitution grants Chinese citizens all basic rights, but also states that such rights are subordinate to the interests of the state and the security of the state. Duihua tries to talk about the problems in China in the context of similar problems in the U.S.
• Duncan Clark: US Internet companies have overplayed their hand, they’re generally doing poorly in comparison to local entities. Chinese companies will bump into the lack of institutional change within China. They won’t have access to lucrative Western markets without some recriprocity. Echoes what Isaac Mao said about different parts of the government (central, provincial, municipal, etc.) having their own motivations and desires.
• MacKinnion asks Charles Mok: Can Hong Kong companies set or be an example for Chinese mainland companies?
• Charles Mok: First question is just “what is a Hong Kong company?” He believes many HK companies do not actually have a strong sene of corporate social responibilities beyond what their basic legal responsibilities and liabilities are. The closest thing by HK companies is when they complain about their corporate e-mail getting blocked by China. HK companies only get concerned if it gets in their way of doing business. Second question: Do HK companies feel they have a role to play? If we look at the media, we already see a lot of self-censorship. So can we expect companies to be the guardians of free speech in Hong Kong? “I doubt it.”
• MacKinnion asks Ching Chiao: Interested in your comparative perspective from a Taiwan perspective.
• Ching Chiao: The past 8 years have been DPP-oriented, so much so that even the websites have noticably become more “green” in color, where the color of green somehow represents the website’s love for Taiwan. One good thing in Taiwan is that the internet has been regarded as a communication/information tool, and hence hasn’t been severely subjected to surveilance and control.

For anyone in Hong Kong, various people from the event will be sharing drinks tonight at The Pawn, located at 62 Johnston Road in WanChai. Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we start at 9:00am.

Part Two: Shanghai PVG May No Longer Suck

After passing through for one reason or another, I’m often compelled to express my disappointment with the sheer inanity of mainland China’s international airports. For all the overwrought grandeur of their exterior architecture, they’ve repeatedly let me down with senseless interior design, poor construction quality, and the lack of confidence-inspiring, waiting-passenger-amusing, branded amenities like…I dunno, Starbucks. Reassuringly, I’m not the only one who feels this way.

Let’s take Shanghai’s Pudong International Airport (PVG) for example. I mean, Shanghai has been a pretty happenin’, cosmopolitan city for awhile now, right? PVG itself is pretty darn new too, having only opened less than 9 years ago in late 1999. So…what’s with the wrist-slitting interior lighting? Why do the grimy, smelly Terminal 1 restrooms remind me of mental asylums? And just why the hell are they located in the basement level anyway?

In contrast, you have the mega-mall that is the Hong Kong International Airport (HKG), where it is more about shopping Bvlgari, Cartier, Prada, Fendi, Gucci, Coach, etc. etc. etc. than about flying anywhere. Seriously, does anyone really need to buy a 6.4 carat Tiffany & Co. diamond engagement ring right before their flight?

In contrast, there’s also the spit, polish, shine, and arigato gozaimasu of Tokyo’s Narita International Airport (NRT)…where the most retarded questions you could possibly ask are cheerfully answered, with the utmost respect for your ancestors, by the cutest Japanese airport personnel.

Both airports are fantastic examples of what an international airport hub for a major international city should look like. Up until now, Shanghai’s PVG Terminal 1 just didn’t cut it. It might look nifty from afar but for anyone who has travelled, it was an embarassment for a major Chinese metropolis like Shanghai.

However, the new Terminal 2 at PVG opened earlier this year and lucky for me, my Air China ticket to America meant I would finally get a chance to check it out. Accordingly, I didn’t have high expectations and frankly, I didn’t have any expectations whatsoever. I’m pretty jaded. Therefore, and fortunately for PVG, I was completely surprised to find something so utterly remarkable that I not only called my friends to share my sudden delight, I’m also writing about it.

Like Terminal 1, there’s plenty of cold steel, concrete columns, and marble expanses in Terminal 2. Unlike Terminal 1, however, there was an abundance of natural lighting, warm wood surfaces to break up the bleak white and grey, and (see above) a huge zen-like indoor waterfall. HoMedics, anyone? The latter was honestly revolutionary enough that everyone walking by took out their cameras to take pictures of this most incredibly inspired airport design feature…in of all China. Oh, and the restrooms not only had comfy baby-changing rooms with seating for weary mothers and weary fathers, I daresay there was even a pleasant scent about them. Lastly, the ultimate coup de grace for any modern traveller: free wi-fi internet and plenty of easily accessible electrical outlets for our laptops and gadgets.

Shanghai’s international airport is finally half-way respectable.

Of course, its not as good as HKG…yet, but it definitely has potential…so long as no one screws it up. As with so many things in post-Mao mainland China, the bar was simply set so low that basically any half-decent improvement results in–and deserves–ecstatic praise. This was a half-decent improvement and we should give them credit where its due. Now, it still has a lot really random, low-quality retail and dining (like Hope Star Coffee & Cate), but there were some known brands and even an Ajisen Ramen. Now the KFC by the Maglev Station won’t have a monopoly on my dining patronage.

Bravo for Shanghai PVG. Next up: Beijing Capital International Airport.

UPDATE:The wifi is frustratingly unreliable, consistently hanging every so often and resulting in serious disruptions to any effort at productivity. In better news, there are a lot more respectable dining and shopping than I previously noticed and mentioned (though still not more than HKG). They have a Burger King.

After a long spell in Shanghai, and aside from a few trips to Hong Kong and Taipei here and there, I’m now writing from beautiful Los Angeles. Officially, I’m here to visit family and friends. Unofficially, I’m here to get a healthy helping of good old American mad-cow. Neither In-N-Out nor Claim Jumper will know what hit them (unless I can somehow make it to the House of Prime Rib).

Of course, I’m not here to bore you with my culinary misadventures in the States. Instead, I wanted to take this opportunity to share my random observations as I made my way out of Shanghai and transferred through Beijing before collecting my luggage at Los Angeles.

Part One: Shanghai Metro Pat-down

After the recent bus explosion fire that had quite a few Chinese friends wondering if the Shanghai Metro system was safe from those dastardly Xinjiang terrorists, I actually wondered: just what sort of security does Shanghai have to stop random terrorists from running into People’s Square and creating an unfathomable disaster. That is, other than the logic disaster of trying to board before letting people off…during rush hour. Rarely have I seen any reasonable security in Shanghai’s metro stations, and it honestly looks all too easy for someone with hidden explosives and malicious intent to just walk on in and obliterate the mob of humanity that uses the metro system daily. With the Olympics quickly approaching and Chinese domestic media scaring the populace with occasional reports of terrorism threatening to derail (heh) China’s rightful ascension to international glory, I thought they’d ramp up security or something. It never felt that they did…

…until I, of all the harmless-looking people in the world, rolled my luggage into the metro station this past Tuesday afternoon.

As I fumbled to stuff my 10 kuai into the ticket vending machine, a station attendant immediately and briskly walked over to me. At first, I actually thought she was coming to offer, gasp, customer service! Pleasantly flattered, I quickly tried to politely wave her off to let her know there’s no need as I understood how to use the machine. But no, she neither cared where I was going or whether I knew how to pay for fare; she just wanted me to open my luggage to show her the explosives I was surely hiding. Oh.

I, of course, complied. I set my luggage down and flipped it open. Interestingly, she didn’t seem too bothered by the brick-like bulk hidding in one corner of my luggage wrapped mysteriously in yellow graphing paper and a baijiu giveaway bag. I mean, national product or not, it could’ve been flammable baijiu, a fatty amount of explosive C4 plastique, or something equally dangerous, like 6 month F visas. No, instead, she poked warily at my Calvin Klein Escape deodorant. I quickly explained its purpose for masking unpleasant, women-luring, body odor. Confounded, she had no choice but to let me continue with my journey.

Four kuai ticket in hand, and suitcase zipped shut again, I quickly entered the station. I glanced back only briefly, you know, to make sure I wasn’t being tailed, due to my pleasing aroma, and made my way towards Shanghai’s Pudong International Airport.

There is an utterly amazing perk many American expats or travellers in China can enjoy so long as they’re customers of Bank of America (whom are legion, despite the fact that Bank of America is somewhat widely despised amongst many in the States): BofA customers can use their BofA ATM card to withdraw the USD in their accounts back home as RMB cash via China Construction Bank ATMs throughout China…for free.

No ATM fees, no currency exchange fees, no credit card cash advance fees, and no need to set up a CCB bank account either. Just cold, hard, delicious cash converted at the day’s exchange rate.

I used this a year ago and, embarassingly, I didn’t think to write about this useful tip until Dan over at China Law Blog just recently discovered and posted about it earlier today.

Now, the daily ATM withdrawal limit in China was raised from 5,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB in mid-2007. Accounting for the current exchange rate (6.94 RMB per 1 USD at the time of this posting), this means you can effectively move up to about 2,880 USD into China each day, barring any daily withdrawal limits you have on your BofA account. If your limit is lower than the converted amount you want to access in China, you’ll need to call Bank of America in advance to raise your limits appropriately, lest you get confounded at the ATM. There’s also the current 2000 RMB per transaction limit at CCB’s ATMs, so you’ll need to repeat the withdrawal process 10 times to get the full 20,000 RMB daily limit. After making everyone behind you wait, however, you can walk smugly past them carrying your fat stacks of 100 RMB bills. Baller.

Now, 20,000 RMB is a decent sum of cash for the vast majority of transactions. That’s about 5000 street-cooked fried rice meals in China or 714 Starbucks cappucinos. Being able to freely access and convert your USD into RMB cash should be particularly useful for business travellers and other short-term visitors. You no longer need to hassle with carrying large amounts of cash, getting cashiers cheques, using wire transfers, or going through the hassle of setting up a Chinese bank account (which would require you to bring money in first anyway). Not only do you save money on fees and exchange rates, it is downright convenient.

The free ATM withdrawals perk has been available since April 2006 and you can thank BofA for opting to buy a stake in CCB and partnering with them instead of pursuing the retail banking market on their own. I, however, only learned about this service in mid-2007 when I needed to quickly move several thousand USD over to cover development costs for my startup, adex360, without fussing with wire transfers. In fact, BofA required me to physically appear at a US banking center just to wire my own money to myself in China. Yeah, like I’m really going to buy a round-trip airplane ticket just so I can pay them an additional 45 USD fee for a wire transfer to myself. I ended up withdrawing over several days to accumulate the RMB bricks I needed.

So yes, you can certainly make withdrawals over several days (or weeks) should you need to move more than 20,000 RMB. Of course, going to the ATM each day isn’t the most graceful way of moving large chunks of money, but it may be less annoying than having to set up, pay for, and then wait for a wire transfer that can sometimes take longer than you prefer. As with my example, you often can’t actually initiate a wire transfer of your own money to yourself from abroad anyway, thereby necessitating that you have someone abroad who can wire funds to you. Moreover, for many expats and travellers, trying to communicate with Chinese tellers when their English is about as good as your Chinglish can be a hassle as well.

There may be more good news too, as it appears that BofA and CCB has had a free wire transfer pilot program in place since late 2006 also. This allows BofA account holders to wire transfer money without the 45 USD fee or the 20,000 RMB daily limit to CCB account holders. But, before you think this is a better option than making 10 withdrawals a day over several days to move larger chunks of money, remember that you need a BofA account, a CCB account, and you’d still need to initiate the transfer at BofA in person in the United States. Therefore, as far as using this to wire your own money to yourself, it would only be useful if you’ve already set up your CCB account and you’re doing initiating the wire transfer right before you fly over from the States to China. The actual target market for this service are family members, friends, and businesses that need to move money between themselves and have the people to initiate and receive wire transfers on both sides. If you’re just one person in China trying to access your money in your US account, then the free ATM withdrawal service is still what you’re looking for…if you’re a BofA customer, that is.

18 days of free ATM withdrawals and you’ll be able to transfer the yearly maximum of 50,000 USD. Heh, how’s that for hedging against RMB appreciation and USD depreciation?

One final note: Despite the conveniences afforded by this partnership, don’t expect any service from CCB banks and representatives regarding your BofA account. The most they’ll know is that you can access your BofA account balance through their ATM. They are not there to help you with managing your account otherwise or answering any BofA questions.

Just read a nicely-written article with interesting statistics about China at The Independent (via Dan over at China Law Blog).

Though China’s market reforms and subsequent economic growth started 30 years ago, it has only been the recent decade where an appreciable amount of the masses are finally grasping just how profound it is. I say “grasping” because even so, the vast majority of them have yet to appreciate or truly understand just what China’s rise to global economic and political prominence will mean, burdened as they are–understandably–by their fears and ultimately their ignorance.

Here is a good excerpt (emphasis mine):

I am not sure we in the West fully grasp the magnitude of what is happening. Intellectually we can see it affecting us but emotionally it is hard to understand that we are moving towards a world where Western ideas, our ideas, will no longer hold sway. China has other ideas. Those will increasingly co-exist alongside ours in shaping global economic and political development….We will not find this comfortable. What we think will matter less and less. But we cannot do anything about it, and in any case, consider the alternative. Would we really want a China that was failing in economic terms, with all the misery that would cause? That would surely be far more dangerous and disruptive to the world than a continuation of China’s thrilling but terrifying success story. (more…)